上GOOGLE打:US BANKS SHORT FUTURE POSITION(%)。
你就可以看華爾街是如何努力打壓金銀價格。
當然,它們怕死了金銀。
銀行家只是打壓金銀價,不會推高,要了解這道理。
有一點要注意:
就是華爾街作空的期貨部位,有約70%~80%用於打壓金價。
你們可以想想,如果沒有華爾街蓄意打壓,現在金銀會漲到多少?
最重要一點,就是雖然華爾街努力打壓,還是無法阻止金銀上漲6-7倍。
這背後暗示了什麼?
說實話,我非常非常感謝華爾街打壓金銀。
不然,我這個以前對貨幣體系一點都不認識的人,
那裡有時間和機會學到貨幣知識後,金銀價格還這麼便宜。
不是我華爾街打壓,我根本沒有機會撿便宜貨。
Gold & Silver: US Banks' Short Position - 15 October 2009[轉載]]
So much for the idea that US banks are "hammering the Gold Price..."
WE'RE BACK in Houston following the 35th New Orleans Investment Conference which mi compadre Brien Lundin puts together each October, upholding the tradition the late James Blanchard started back in 1974, writes Gene Arensberg in his Got Gold Report.
If you missed this year's event you missed a lot, but take heart. High-quality DVDs will likely be available soon at the conference web site.
My own particular favorite of this years confab was the thoughtful commentary by Charles Krauthammer, who reminded us that the so-called "public option" of proposed healthcare legislation is merely a "foot in the door for the government to take over." Krauthammer's talk was a must-see.
I began my own presentation by pointing out that it's difficult for humans to conceive of just how much a trillion Dollars is, and offered up this simple example to illustrate it.
And as of Tuesday last week, with gold then at $1041.96 an ounce, the two US banks with reportable futures positions (one bank less than the previous month) held a total of 10 contracts long gold and a total of 116,790 contracts short gold for a total net short position of 116,780 Comex 100-ounce contracts.
That was with a total open interest in the Gold Futures market of 484,307 contracts. And this was while all commercial traders as a group (all 55 of them) reported a net short position of 281,864 contracts the same day.
A net short position in Gold Futures benefits if the price of gold falls, but could theoretically represent offsetting transactions to hedge the risk of opposite positions in physical metal, or perhaps financial derivatives in other markets.
For comparison, as of July 7th – three months prior – three reporting US banks held a net short position of 116,457 gold contracts, while all commercial traders as a group reported 191,307 gold contracts net short. The Gold Price was then at $924.65 an ounce, and total open interest in Comex Gold Futures stood at 372,985 contracts.
The US banks' nominal net short position is shown in the graph below, as sourced from the CFTC data.
Over the last 3 months, as gold metal increased by $117 per ounce – some 12.7% – the large, well-funded and presumably well-informed banks first reduced their net short positioning by a little over 41,000 contracts in August and September.
But over the last month, those same US reporting banks put all that net short positioning back on. So the net effect, on a nominal basis, is that as gold rose $117 over three months, the US bank net short position basically got back to where it was when gold was at $924.65 in July.
During the same July-October period, the total combined collective commercial net short positioning (from all traders classed as commercial, including refineries and large wholesalers) actually ROSE a huge 90,557 contracts – swelling by some 47% from 191,307 to a teeth gnashing 281,864 contracts net short.
This means that, measured as a percentage of all commercial net short positions, the US banks' net short positioning (now held by two, rather than three institutions) fell from almost 61% in July to about 41% inside three reporting months, even as gold marched higher, as shown by the last four data points in the chart below.
In Texas English, so much for the idea that the two US banks are "hammering the gold market" or anything of the kind. As a percentage of all commercial traders the two US banks have clearly become a considerably smaller portion of the net short game, according to the figures reported by the CFTC.
Looking at just the US banks' positioning in silver, on the other hand, two US banks reported holding 38 contracts long and 38,375 contracts short of silver for a total net short position of 38,337 Comex 5,000-ounce contracts as of October 6th. Total open interest stood at 131,801 contracts, and silver closed on the cash market then at $17.35 an ounce.
The nominal net short positioning of the US banks in silver increased over the prior month by 8,462 contracts, some 28.3%, as silver metal increased $2.34 or 15.6%.
But although it looks like a large jump, the increase in the US banks' silver futures net short positioning was actually only slightly higher than the increase in the total open interest on a percentage basis month to month. The open interest increased 25,130 contracts – some 23.6% – with the total number of open contracts rising from 106,671 to 131,801.
All commercial traders as a group (all 36 of them) held a net short silver futures position of 65,188 contracts as of October 6th. That was an increase of 17,132 contracts or 35.7% month to month. So the two US banks' percentage of the total commercial net short positioning actually fell slightly from 62.2% to 58.8% over the past month as shown in the graph below.
The nominal size of the bank's net short positioning increased by the second-highest amount ever in one reporting month since the CFTC began reporting bank positioning in 2006. (The highest was the huge 27,628 contract jump the month of August, 2008.) But because the net short positioning of all commercial traders increased substantially more for the period, the effective relative net short positioning of the two banks to all commercial futures traders became slightly less than it was a month ago.
Simply stated, the two US banks roughly kept pace with all the other traders classed by the CFTC as commercial. But with just two large US banks holding over 29% of all the Comex silver contracts now open – and equal to some 59% of all the commercial net short position – the overall shape of the silver futures market remained very highly concentrated.
The CFTC is likely to announce new federal position limit proposals for public comment in the energy futures markets and possibly also the metals markets fairly soon. Here at Got Gold Report we continue to doubt that the CFTC will adopt hard position limits for actors on the financial hedging side of the metals markets battlefield, but we wouldn't mind being wrong about that.
When just two reporting entities are able to amass a net short position in silver of 38,000-plus contracts, over three times the 6,000-contract accountability limits (for two traders) imposed by the Comex division of the New York Mercantile Exchange (Nymex), that's one reason many feel that the market is structured to give the hedgers and short sellers an advantage much of the time.
Earlier this year, during several days of hearings on the subject of the CFTC taking over the job of setting position limits in the energy futures markets, we often heard the phrase "excessive speculation" from the CFTC commissioners. But not once did we ever hear anything that sounded like the commission was at all worried about excessive hedging or short selling.
We took the view then – and continue to believe – that this CFTC, under chairman Gary Gensler, is more concerned with trying to manage energy prices lower by limiting the position limits for players on the long side, while preserving the ability of large actors on the short side to ignore those same limits.
That is not exactly a level playing field. A level playing field would have the exact same position limits for all players no matter who they are, nor what side they are on.
Bullion banks are able to take such large, over-limit positioning in aggregated accounts for their clients in silver futures via "exemptions for bona fide hedgers", even though they neither mine nor produce silver. Some of the bullion banks' positioning instead seeks to generate an income from an otherwise static asset (metal sitting in vaults) for themselves and their clients, by selling paper derivatives based on that metal located here and abroad. Since very little metal will actually ever be delivered to settle those derivatives, it's safe to say that much of that positioning is purely financial hedging.
Even though Chairman Gensler mentioned in his July 7 opening comments for the hearings that the commission intends to take another look at how exemptions to position limits are implemented, all of the restrictions and restrictive actions the commission has taken thus far affect only those traders who aggregated positions on the long side, such as reneging on exemptions to grain traders and threatening to do the same with aggregators of exchange traded fund investors in oil and natural gas.
Again, we'd love to be wrong on this one, but so far we've seen nothing that suggests that the CFTC intends to actually level the playing field when it comes to position limits in the metals markets. Not that it actually makes any difference in the long run.
No matter how concentrated the positioning on the Comex gets – and no matter how many contracts the banks decide to sell short – the metals markets are global and will inevitably seek their supply-demand equilibrium over time.
As a practical matter, position limits in one futures market might make a difference for very short periods of time (no pun intended), but over the long haul there's nothing that can stop the metals from seeking a liquidity-driven market price in the real world.
Looking for real physical Gold today...? Make Buying Gold simple, secure and cost-effective...owning your metal outright but free from the hassle of arranging storage yourself...at BullionVault...
Gene Arensberg, 15 Oct '09
WE'RE BACK in Houston following the 35th New Orleans Investment Conference which mi compadre Brien Lundin puts together each October, upholding the tradition the late James Blanchard started back in 1974, writes Gene Arensberg in his Got Gold Report.
If you missed this year's event you missed a lot, but take heart. High-quality DVDs will likely be available soon at the conference web site.
My own particular favorite of this years confab was the thoughtful commentary by Charles Krauthammer, who reminded us that the so-called "public option" of proposed healthcare legislation is merely a "foot in the door for the government to take over." Krauthammer's talk was a must-see.
I began my own presentation by pointing out that it's difficult for humans to conceive of just how much a trillion Dollars is, and offered up this simple example to illustrate it.
"Each paper Dollar is 6.1 inches long. If one were to place one trillion of them touching end to end, beginning at the earth, that line of paper Dollars would stretch out into space three-million-miles...PAST THE SUN!Over in the Gold Futures market, meanwhile, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) just published its monthly Bank Participation in the Futures and Options Markets Report. Detailing US bank positioning as of October 6th, it was released a little late this month for some unknown (to me) reason. But as always, it shows the positioning of reporting banks in the US futures markets for commodities including Gold and silver.
"That's right, one trillion $1 bills would stretch over 96 million miles…Does that put a trillion Dollars into better perspective?"
And as of Tuesday last week, with gold then at $1041.96 an ounce, the two US banks with reportable futures positions (one bank less than the previous month) held a total of 10 contracts long gold and a total of 116,790 contracts short gold for a total net short position of 116,780 Comex 100-ounce contracts.
That was with a total open interest in the Gold Futures market of 484,307 contracts. And this was while all commercial traders as a group (all 55 of them) reported a net short position of 281,864 contracts the same day.
A net short position in Gold Futures benefits if the price of gold falls, but could theoretically represent offsetting transactions to hedge the risk of opposite positions in physical metal, or perhaps financial derivatives in other markets.
For comparison, as of July 7th – three months prior – three reporting US banks held a net short position of 116,457 gold contracts, while all commercial traders as a group reported 191,307 gold contracts net short. The Gold Price was then at $924.65 an ounce, and total open interest in Comex Gold Futures stood at 372,985 contracts.
The US banks' nominal net short position is shown in the graph below, as sourced from the CFTC data.
Over the last 3 months, as gold metal increased by $117 per ounce – some 12.7% – the large, well-funded and presumably well-informed banks first reduced their net short positioning by a little over 41,000 contracts in August and September.
But over the last month, those same US reporting banks put all that net short positioning back on. So the net effect, on a nominal basis, is that as gold rose $117 over three months, the US bank net short position basically got back to where it was when gold was at $924.65 in July.
During the same July-October period, the total combined collective commercial net short positioning (from all traders classed as commercial, including refineries and large wholesalers) actually ROSE a huge 90,557 contracts – swelling by some 47% from 191,307 to a teeth gnashing 281,864 contracts net short.
This means that, measured as a percentage of all commercial net short positions, the US banks' net short positioning (now held by two, rather than three institutions) fell from almost 61% in July to about 41% inside three reporting months, even as gold marched higher, as shown by the last four data points in the chart below.
In Texas English, so much for the idea that the two US banks are "hammering the gold market" or anything of the kind. As a percentage of all commercial traders the two US banks have clearly become a considerably smaller portion of the net short game, according to the figures reported by the CFTC.
Looking at just the US banks' positioning in silver, on the other hand, two US banks reported holding 38 contracts long and 38,375 contracts short of silver for a total net short position of 38,337 Comex 5,000-ounce contracts as of October 6th. Total open interest stood at 131,801 contracts, and silver closed on the cash market then at $17.35 an ounce.
The nominal net short positioning of the US banks in silver increased over the prior month by 8,462 contracts, some 28.3%, as silver metal increased $2.34 or 15.6%.
But although it looks like a large jump, the increase in the US banks' silver futures net short positioning was actually only slightly higher than the increase in the total open interest on a percentage basis month to month. The open interest increased 25,130 contracts – some 23.6% – with the total number of open contracts rising from 106,671 to 131,801.
All commercial traders as a group (all 36 of them) held a net short silver futures position of 65,188 contracts as of October 6th. That was an increase of 17,132 contracts or 35.7% month to month. So the two US banks' percentage of the total commercial net short positioning actually fell slightly from 62.2% to 58.8% over the past month as shown in the graph below.
The nominal size of the bank's net short positioning increased by the second-highest amount ever in one reporting month since the CFTC began reporting bank positioning in 2006. (The highest was the huge 27,628 contract jump the month of August, 2008.) But because the net short positioning of all commercial traders increased substantially more for the period, the effective relative net short positioning of the two banks to all commercial futures traders became slightly less than it was a month ago.
Simply stated, the two US banks roughly kept pace with all the other traders classed by the CFTC as commercial. But with just two large US banks holding over 29% of all the Comex silver contracts now open – and equal to some 59% of all the commercial net short position – the overall shape of the silver futures market remained very highly concentrated.
The CFTC is likely to announce new federal position limit proposals for public comment in the energy futures markets and possibly also the metals markets fairly soon. Here at Got Gold Report we continue to doubt that the CFTC will adopt hard position limits for actors on the financial hedging side of the metals markets battlefield, but we wouldn't mind being wrong about that.
When just two reporting entities are able to amass a net short position in silver of 38,000-plus contracts, over three times the 6,000-contract accountability limits (for two traders) imposed by the Comex division of the New York Mercantile Exchange (Nymex), that's one reason many feel that the market is structured to give the hedgers and short sellers an advantage much of the time.
Earlier this year, during several days of hearings on the subject of the CFTC taking over the job of setting position limits in the energy futures markets, we often heard the phrase "excessive speculation" from the CFTC commissioners. But not once did we ever hear anything that sounded like the commission was at all worried about excessive hedging or short selling.
We took the view then – and continue to believe – that this CFTC, under chairman Gary Gensler, is more concerned with trying to manage energy prices lower by limiting the position limits for players on the long side, while preserving the ability of large actors on the short side to ignore those same limits.
That is not exactly a level playing field. A level playing field would have the exact same position limits for all players no matter who they are, nor what side they are on.
Bullion banks are able to take such large, over-limit positioning in aggregated accounts for their clients in silver futures via "exemptions for bona fide hedgers", even though they neither mine nor produce silver. Some of the bullion banks' positioning instead seeks to generate an income from an otherwise static asset (metal sitting in vaults) for themselves and their clients, by selling paper derivatives based on that metal located here and abroad. Since very little metal will actually ever be delivered to settle those derivatives, it's safe to say that much of that positioning is purely financial hedging.
Even though Chairman Gensler mentioned in his July 7 opening comments for the hearings that the commission intends to take another look at how exemptions to position limits are implemented, all of the restrictions and restrictive actions the commission has taken thus far affect only those traders who aggregated positions on the long side, such as reneging on exemptions to grain traders and threatening to do the same with aggregators of exchange traded fund investors in oil and natural gas.
Again, we'd love to be wrong on this one, but so far we've seen nothing that suggests that the CFTC intends to actually level the playing field when it comes to position limits in the metals markets. Not that it actually makes any difference in the long run.
No matter how concentrated the positioning on the Comex gets – and no matter how many contracts the banks decide to sell short – the metals markets are global and will inevitably seek their supply-demand equilibrium over time.
As a practical matter, position limits in one futures market might make a difference for very short periods of time (no pun intended), but over the long haul there's nothing that can stop the metals from seeking a liquidity-driven market price in the real world.
Looking for real physical Gold today...? Make Buying Gold simple, secure and cost-effective...owning your metal outright but free from the hassle of arranging storage yourself...at BullionVault...
13 則留言:
打壓金價的另一證據:麥克馬龍尼的新文章
http://goldsilver.com/news/gold-and-silver-manipulation-high-frequency-shearing/
TO 王小樹:
知道金銀被政府和銀行家蓄意打壓,
可以明白為何我說投資金銀的對手是政府和銀行家的原因了吧!
我還是那一老話:
你若相信政府和銀行可以永遠違逆自然經濟規律,就不要買金銀。
如果你相信經濟規律必然取得最後勝利,就買金銀。
投資金銀的對手是【所有政府】(包过中国)和【所有銀行家】=100%正确
但,您几时看过普通平民百姓“斗"得过政府?!
只要几百只所谓的国会议员,就可以制定‘新法令’,如普通平民百姓不准交易金银。
注意,可交易与不可交易或困难交易,都影响着大家收藏实体金银的意愿,除非您纯粹喜欢“收藏”。…^.^
想发财,就收藏古董‘古画‘艺术品。
收藏实体金银,应该只能跑赢通膨。
收藏纸上金银,就是个赌字。
TO 仙家岭80年牙兰:
普通平民百姓“斗"不過政府和銀行家...一般情況是這樣。
但只是一般...
問一問,1970年代黃金牛市怎樣來的?
強大的明朝如何被百姓推翻的?
一千年來,歷史出現很多法定貨幣,但是沒有一個活下來,金銀又再次貨幣化?
why?
問一問你自己,如果你手中的ringgit每星期跌1%,1%就夠了!
到時,你會怎麼做?
繼續收ringgit嗎?
ringgit 去荷兰料~~
6年里,ringgit贬料【50%~80%】!
俺可没叫人收纸币放FD,这摆明送钱给政府!
@
请问強大的明朝的聪明的收藏金银家们,都传宗接代到哪里去了?
二千年來,全世界歷史政府可都在用金银当貨幣,为何财政还是酱糟糕,灭了一国又一国?
还是这句,收藏实体金银,应该只能跑赢通膨,还要小心不要被抢!MALAYSIA 的治安几 BOLEH 下的。。。。
@
汗多人恨不得美国倒,俺马是。
但,当美国佬老羞成怒时,第三次世界大战也近了,如果您懂第一跟第二次世界大战的起因。
TO 仙家岭80年牙兰:
金銀不是用來抗通膨,你搞錯了!
金銀是用來對沖政府財政崩潰
金銀用來抗通膨=對沖政府財政崩潰
就您的“10000克金=10000元理论”,
如政府財政印多500倍纸币,
金也会升500倍,
这是“保值”的意思,没发达^^
也就是”抗通膨“的意思。
黑哥,【看衰纸币】咱俩意见是一致的。
俺也不反对大家收金银,
俺就不爽一买一卖就被“吃”料15%~20%。
俺比较偏向收土地,实货,必用商品股。
TO 仙家岭80年牙兰:
你忽視了三點:
1.通膨和金價不同步。通膨會先跑很多年,金價卻不漲,這就有價值低估空間。
2.當對紙幣失去信心時,金銀價格會漲的比印鈔速度還快。
3.瘋狂時期的不合理的飆漲。
1970年代,通膨不超過3倍,金價長期被低估使它漲12倍,加上瘋狂漲到24倍
歷史上,當通膨一來,土地,实货,必用商品股。都不管用!
尤其股票死更慘,土地還不錯
您的三點就跟股票没俩样:
1.通膨(业绩)和金價(股价)不同步。通膨(业绩)會先跑很多年,金價(股价)卻不漲,這就有價值低估空間。
2.當對紙幣失去信心時(当大户要炒时),金銀(股价)價格會漲的比印鈔(业绩)速度還快。
3.瘋狂時期的不合理的飆漲(炒股)。【高潮之后是低潮】
1970年代,通膨不超過3倍,金價長期被低估使它漲12倍,加上瘋狂漲到24倍
×【重点就是时机】,俺自认无预知能力,无法等。
@
(歷史上,當通膨一來,土地,实货,必用商品股。都不管用!尤其股票死更慘,土地還不錯)
【歷史上,大众银行/云顶等,经历过1997‘2001’2008大股灾‘高通膨,股价还是起了N倍。】
----------------------------------
ps:俺没大众银行/云顶,也没建议你们收。俺只建议『收股只收老实股』。
TO 仙家岭80年牙兰:
看來,你還不是真正了解通膨的禍害.
通膨對你來說,只是一個模糊卻不它背後意義的名詞
這40年來,全球環境都是年年通膨,很多人都變成溫水的青蛙,已經忘了通膨的真正禍害了
我不認為你會蠢到高通膨下,大眾雲頂可以捱得住,股價不會狂跌。你只是逞口舌而已。
20%的通膨,就足以摧毀經濟。
1970年代美國8%-15%的通膨,美國股市價值就跌了2/3。
這種情況下,可以逆勢而漲的股票少之有少,有你也選不到,選到也不會投入所有身家。
看來,你還不是真正了解通膨的好处。
您应该无法反对通膨也有好处。
表乱歪曲跟无中生有于俺的言论。
大眾雲頂股只是个『例子』,您可以拿纸币购买力的历史图表来对比。俺没讲股灾时股价不会掉,1997年通膨》20%吧,现在大眾雲頂股几多钱了,这是【历史】,俺没乱乱举『例子』吧。
大家都只是逞口舌而已。
论对错,只有未来历史能证明。
~信神得救~
張貼留言